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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Dustin S. West appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty
of felony intimidating a witness.

On appeal, West challenges the sufficiency of evidence

supporting his conviction.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Briana Warner Phillips lived at a residence with Justin Davis (the homeowner), Justin's
four children, and West. (Trial Tr., p.93, L.22 - p.95, L.21.) Ms. Phillips occasionally provided
day-care for Davis's children, and considered herself as their nanny. (Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.8-11;
p.98, L.3 - p.99, L.8.) Ms. Phillips met West through Davis, and she had known him about six
months. (Trial Tr., p.111, Ls.1-7.)
On the morning of July 19, 2017, Ms. Phillips was sleeping in her downstairs bedroom
when she was woken by West, who was looking for the keys to Davis's car so he could drive to a
courthouse proceeding. (Trial Tr., p.106, L.12 - p.108, L.17; p.110, Ls.14-18.) West "was
storming throughout the house screaming, 'Where the fuck are the keys?"' (Trial Tr., p.108, Ls.1718.) Ms. Phillips told West that the keys should be on the coffee table, but they also might be at a
friend's ("Joe's") house. (Trial Tr., p.113, L.3 - p.114, L.24.) West looked on the coffee table
and returned, saying he was going to go outside and smoke a cigarette. (Trial Tr., p.114, L.25 p.115, L.4.) When West came back into the house and into Ms. Phillips' bedroom, she "let him
know [her] feelings of the manner in which he was asking" about the keys. (Trial Tr., p.115, L.6
- p.116, L.21.) West entered Ms. Phillips' bedroom, pushed her onto the bed, got on top of her,
and "with both fists started hitting [her]." (Trial Tr., p.115, L.25 - p.116, L.2.)

1

West hit Ms.

Phillips with his fists about 20 to 40 times in her face, breast, chest, and arms, as she was balled
up for protection. (Trial Tr., p.118, Ls.6-15; p.161, Ls.15-22.)
Five or six hours before Ms. Phillips went to bed that night before, she put a gun (a “Kimber
.44”) owned by Davis on a shelf above her bed for protection. (Trial Tr., p.118, Ls.23-25; p.120,
L.9 – p.121, L.15; p.125, L.25 – p.126, L.4.) As West hit Ms. Phillips with his fists, he grabbed
the gun, which was only 12 to 18 inches away, and then he stopped hitting her. (Trial Tr., p.118,
Ls.17-25.) At that point, West told Ms. Phillips, “If you call the cops, I’m going to fucking kill
you,” and he put the gun to her face (touching her right cheek with it). (Trial Tr., p.125, L.1 –
p.127, L.12.) Ms. Phillips estimated that West pointed the gun at her for 10 to 20 seconds. (Id.)
West then ran out the door, and sat the gun down on a chair next to the vanity in the room. (Trial
Tr., p.127, L.13 – p.128, L.6.) Ms. Phillips believed West when he told her, “If you call the cops,
I’ll fucking kill you,” and was “scared for her life.” (Trial Tr., p.128, Ls.13-20.) The incident was
reported to law enforcement after Ms. Phillips told her husband about it, and police arrived at the
residence about 15 to 20 minutes later. (Trial Tr., p.132, Ls.2-11; p.133, Ls.7-9.)
The state charged West with aggravated assault, felon in possession of a firearm, and felony
intimidating a witness. (R., pp.42-44.) West was tried by a jury and found not guilty of aggravated
assault and felon in possession of a firearm, but guilty of felony intimidating a witness. (R.,
pp.121-125.) The district court sentenced West to five years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.137138.) Because West’s appeal was not timely, the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed it on that basis,
and entered a Remittitur on May 23, 2018. (R., pp.143-146, 152-153.) West filed a postconviction petition, and was granted relief in the form of a new 42-day period to file a direct appeal.
(R., pp.154-156, 166-169.)

The court entered an Amended Judgment and Commitment

2

(“Amended to Restart Time for Appeal”) (R., pp.166-167), and West filed a timely Amended
Notice of Appeal (R., pp.170-174).

3

ISSUE
West

Was

states the issues

0n appeal

as:

the evidence sufﬁcient t0 support Mr. West’s conviction for intimidating a

Witness?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Did the

was

state present substantial

evidence t0 prove beyond a reasonable doubt that West

guilty 0f felony intimidating a Witness?

ARGUMENT
The

State Presented Substantial Evidence

T0 Support West’s Conviction For Felony

Intimidating

A Witness
A.

Introduction

West challenges

the sufﬁciency of the evidence supporting his conviction for felony

West argues

intimidating a witness.

that

he “could not, as a matter of law, be

liable for

intimidating, inﬂuencing, impeding, deterring, threatening, harassing, obstructing, 0r preventing

Ms.

Phillips

from

‘testifying freely, fully

evidentiary hearing,

when no such

and

truthfully’ in a criminal

hearing was pending or contemplated

purported intimidation.“ (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) West’s argument

Standard

B.

at the

time 0f the

fails.

Of Review

“Appellate review 0f the sufﬁciency of evidence

Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011).

judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict
rational trier of fact could

is

limited in scope.” State V. Marsh, 153

An

appellate court will not set aside a

if there is substantial

evidence upon Which a

have found the essential elements 0f the crime beyond a reasonable

State V. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292,

doubt.

proceeding or juvenile

955 P.2d 603, 607

(Ct.

App. 1997); State

V.

Reyes,

121 Idaho 570, 572, 826 P.2d 919, 921 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review the appellate
court will not substitute

its

View

for that

0f the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to

be given t0 the testimony, 0r the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Idaho

at

West

131

292, 955 P.2d at 607; State V. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App.

1991). Moreover, the facts, and inferences t0 be

1

m,

drawn from those

facts, are

construed in favor 0f

further states that “[a] person cannot be liable for Violating § 18-2604(3) in the absence of

a pending criminal proceeding or juvenile evidentiary hearing.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10 n.
5

1.)

upholding the jury’s verdict.

m,

131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State V. Hart, 112 Idaho

759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).

The

interpretation

and application 0f a

statute is a question

0f law subject to de novo

review. State V. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. App. 201

1).

The State Presented Sufﬁcient Evidence T0 Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That West
Committed Felony Intimidating A Witness

C.

At

trial,

Ms.

Phillips testiﬁed that after

gun from a shelf above her bed, held
fucking

kill

it

you.” (Trial TL, p.1 18, L.6

that because, at that

moment,

there

West repeatedly hit her with
and

said, “If

1; p.

125, Ls.3-10.)

t0 her face

— p.1 19,

L.1

was n0 criminal proceeding

you

his ﬁsts,

call the cops,

he grabbed a

I’m going

t0

On appeal, West contends

in existence in

which Ms.

Phillips

could have been called as a Witness, he could not have been found guilty of felony intimidating a
Witness as a matter 0f law.

(E generally Appellant’s Brief); ﬂ alﬂ LC. §

West’s challenge to the sufﬁciency of the evidence
for a defendant t0

is

18-2604(3).2

entirely predicated

be found guilty of felony intimidating a Witness, must there have been a criminal

proceeding pending

at the

time of the intimidation in Which the Victim could have been called to

testify? In State V. Curry, 153

Idaho 394, 283 P.3d 141 (Ct. App. 2012), the Idaho Court

speciﬁcally held that n0 pending criminal proceeding

Idaho Code § 18-2604(3) (emphasis added)

oprpeals

was required for such crime. However, West

argues that, because Curry ultimately held the evidence was insufﬁcient to

2

0n one question:

show

that

states:

Any

person Who, by direct or indirect force, 0r by any threats t0 person or
property, or by any manner wilfully intimidates, inﬂuences, impedes, deters,
(3)

threatens, harasses, obstructs or prevents, a Witness, including a child Witness, or

any person Who

may be called as

a witness or any person he believes

may be called

any criminal proceeding or juvenile evidentiary hearing from
fully and truthfully in that criminal proceeding 0r juvenile
evidentiary hearing is guilty 0f a felony.
as a witness in

testifying freely,

6

Curry

directed his threats toward the alleged Victim,

m

it

was unnecessary

for the Court to ﬁrst rule that

there does not have t0 be a pending criminal proceeding for a person t0

a witness, and

initial

“If the statement

is

commit felony intimidating

holding was mere dicta.

not necessary t0 decide the issue presented to the appellate court,

it is

m

considered t0 be dictum and not controlling.” State V. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74, 305 P.3d 5 13,

518 (2013)

mill,

87 Idaho 361, 365, 393 P.2d 585, 587 (1964)). In

(citing Petersen V. State,

122 Idaho 25, 34-35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1172-1 173 (1992)

Law Dictionary 454

(quoting Black’s

Dictum.

A

(6th ed.

1990)), “dictum”

statement, remark, 0r observation.

voluntary representation; one which a party

is

(J.

Bistline, special concurrence)

was deﬁned

as follows:

Gratis dictum; a gratuitous 0r

not bound to make. Simplex dictum;

a mere assertion; an assertion without proof.

The word

is

generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum, ‘a remark

by

an observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an
opinion upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of law, or the

the way;’ that

is,

solution of a question suggested
the case 0r essential t0
the

court merely

its

by the case

at bar,

but not necessarily involved in

determination; any statement of the law enunciated

by way

0f

illustration,

argument, analogy,

by

or suggestion.

Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule 0f law or legal
proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in

hand or

obiter dicta,

and lack the force 0f an adjudication. Wheeler

v.

Wheeler, 98

C010. 568, 58 P.2d 1223, 1226 [1936]. Dicta are opinions 0f a judge Which do not

embody

the resolution or determination of the court, and

made without argument,

or full consideration of the point, are not the professed deliberate determinations 0f
the judge himself.

In Cu_rry, the issue ofwhether the charge 0f felony intimidating a witness requires a pending

criminal proceeding

either

was speciﬁcally raised and argued

one ofthe two parts

failed,

as the ﬁrst part of its two-part analysis. If

Curry’s conviction could not be sustained. The Court

oprpeals

explained the two issues as follows:

Curry argues he could not have entered the garage With the intent to intimidate a
witness for two reasons: (1) because n0 criminal proceeding was pending; and (2)

because, at the point in time he approached the garage,

it

was apparent Ferra was

not present.

The Cirry decision considered

Cirry, 153 Idaho at 397, 283 P.3d at 144.

the

two

issues in

sequence, ﬁrst analyzing the applicable statute (LC. § 18-2604(3)) and case law in regard t0

Whether there must be a pending criminal proceeding t0 convict someone for felony intimidating
a witness.3 The Court of Appeals held as follows:

Idaho Code § 18-2604(3) criminalizes a defendant’s intimidation of a witness who
may testify in the future. State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 123, 126, 138 P.3d 323, 326
(Ct. App. 2005), aﬁ’d, 143 Idaho 108, 138 P.3d 308 (2006). Upon interpretation

0f the

statute in

Mercer,

this

[This] subsecti0n[

]

Court

stated:

criminalize[s] the intimidation of a witness that

the defendant believes Will testify

believes that a person

may

.

.

.

.

That

guilty of intimidating a witness irrespective

if a

is,

be called as a witness

.

.

.

,

defendant

he

may

be

ofwhether either party

ever intended t0 call the victim 0f this intimidation as a witness.
Giving effect t0 every word and clause of the statute, we also must
consider LC. § 18—2604(5), Which states that it is not a defense that
the person actually testiﬁed, eliminating the possibility that actual
alteration
§

[ ]

of the person’s testimony

18—2604(3)

.

.

.

.

The

effect

.

.

.

is

required for Violations of I.C.

is t0

criminalize the defendant’s

conduct alone and not to make the criminality 0f the conduct subj ect
to the defendant’s success in

testimony.
threat is

The crime

made

Mercer, 143 Idaho

is

inﬂuencing or preventing the witness’

committed 0r completed

not at the time the testimony

at 126,

138 P.3d

at

is

at the

time the

offered.

326 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

Whether a criminal proceeding was pending

whether Curry entered
the garage with the intent to intimidate a witness. In accord With the broad wording
in the statute and this Court’s previous interpretation, if a defendant believes a
witness

may

testiﬁ/ in the future at

is

irrelevant to

a criminal proceeding he believes

may ensue

and intimidates that witness in Violation of this statute, his guilt does not turn 0n
Whether a criminal proceeding has already been formally initiated.
Cur_ry,

3

153 Idaho

at

397-398, 283 P.3d

at

144-145

(last

emphasis added).

An initial holding that a criminal proceeding must be in existence

would have concluded

at the

time of the intimidation

the “sufﬁciency of the evidence” issue favorably to Curry.
8

Applying Mercer‘s determination

that the defendant’s belief is the relevant consideration,

coupled With the broad wording 0f I.C. § 18-2604(3),4 the question in Cu_rry became Whether Curry
believed the Victim may be called as a Witness to testify in a future criminal proceeding — regardless

0f whether such proceeding “had already been formally

initiated.”

decision that there does not have to be a pending criminal proceeding

Li.

is

The Court of Appeals’

Had the Court

not dicta.

determined that a pending criminal proceeding was required to convict a person 0f felony
intimidating a witness, there

would have been no need

5
Curry actually intimidated the Victim.

120, 126 (Pa. Super. 201 1) (dissent

4

ﬂ

Haun

V.

t0 consider the

Community Health Systems,

by dissent by J. Mundy)

The Statement 0f Purpose 0f RS 11019,

second issue — whether

(“I

the legislative bill

Inc.,

14 A.3d

reason that the panel’s preliminary

amending LC.

§

18-2604(3) in

1985, states in part:
This bill

is

designed

t0

widen the scope offhe current witness intimidation

statute by allowing prosecution in a broader category

makes

this activity a felony

whenever

it is

0f situations.

related to a criminal hearing

Further,
.

.

.

.

it

The

ambiguity 0f the current statute has severely hampered the prosecution of
outrageous conduct involving Witness harassment.
is an attempt t0 further protect victims and witnesses, which
conformance with the current concernfor witness/victim welfare and

This bill

attempt

is in

protection.

(Emphases added.)
5

Having disposed of the ﬁrst 0f the two-part query, Curry continued:

The remaining question

is

whether there was substantial evidence that would

support the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt

Whether there was substantial evidence

—

that

is,

time 0f his entry, Curry intended
to intimidate Ferra, believing Ferra would be found at the home (whether he saw
that, at the

her in the garage or not), and that he believed she

some
Cur_ry,

future proceeding.

153 Idaho

at

398, 283 P.3d at 145 (emphasis added).

may

be called as a Witness in

determination

in

Curran

is

essential to

its

ruling and, therefore, should not be considered dicta to the holding

Children’s Serv. Ctr., 578 A.2d

[v.

8,

In short, the Court’s

13 (Pa. Super. 1990)].”).

holding on the ﬁrst issue was not turned into dicta simply because the evidence 0n the second issue
failed to

show

that Curry’s

The “holding”

conduct constituted actual intimidation of the alleged Victim.

(Vis-e‘l-Vis

0f Cu_rrﬁ determination 0f the “pending

“dicta”) nature

proceeding” issue can also be seen in relation to the IaW-of-the-case doctrine. Hypothetically,
the Cirry case

had been remanded for a new trial

under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the
ruling

by the Court 0f Appeals — the

pending

at the

trial

state

court

this case involves

E

appellate court”).

Had there been such

a

Even
it is

like

West should be

if the initial

Agencies

V.

E.P.A.

(et

211.),

correct that this statement

91

1,

prove there was a criminal proceeding
V.

law as established during the appeal, and

in Cu_rry, the initial determination

m

Inasmuch
initial

by the Court

as Curry’s trial court,

ruling as a holding, there

is

upon such

is

no reason

considered t0 be dicta, for the reasons stated above,

made the holding of this Court here.

734 F.3d 1115, 1135 (D.C.

is dicta,

Swanson, 134 Idaho 5 12, 5 17, 5

free t0 disregard that ruling as dicta.

holding in Cirry

persuasive and should be

t0 follow the initial

were raised on appeal and passed upon by the

of Appeals would have been deemed a holding.

Why outside parties

issues considered,

an appeal and subsequent remand, the ‘law 0f the

remand

remand, would have been required to follow

to

Swanson

case’ doctrine binds the lower court t0 follow the

therefore precludes reopening any issues that

two

would have been required

would not have

time 0f the witness intimidation.

P.3d 973, 978 (2000) (“Since

for reasons unrelated to the

if

we now

elevate

it

Cir.,

E

Nat. Ass’n. of Clean

2013) (“While Sierra Club

t0 holding”). In State V. Crider,

Water

may be

487 N.E.2d

913 (Ohio App. 1984), the Ninth District of the Ohio Court 0f Appeals expressed the logic

inherently shared in

Cugy’s

“dicta” as follows:

10

was designed t0 protect those people who saw, heard 0r
otherwise knew, 0r were supposed to know, material facts about the criminal
proceeding. Once a person becomes possessed of such material facts, he likewise
becomes a “witness” within the meaning 0f R.C. 2921.03, and subject to its
The intimidation

statute

protection.

would be ludicrous t0 hold that the Victim, who was intimidated, is not a
“Witness” under R.C. 2921.03(A) because the victim had not yet had the
It

opportunity to identify the offender, the prosecution had not yet issued a complaint

him to commence proceedings.
The accused, ifguilly, generally knows the witnesses who can testiﬁ/ against him
before as well as after they are known t0 the police and the prosecuting attorney.
Therefore, the victim became a “witness” at the time 0fthe original victimization
and Within the ambit 0f protection offered by R.C. 292 1 .O3(A).
against him, 0r the police had not yet apprehended

(Emphasis added.)
Crider‘s rationale for extending protection t0 Witnesses

t0

commence

who have

not had the opportunity

criminal proceedings against an intimidator, combined with the defendant’s general

knowledge 0f “the witnesses who can testify against him before

.

.

.

they are

known to

and the prosecuting attorney” (Q), makes sense. Here, West had t0 know that Ms.

the police

Phillips,

Whom

he had just battered, might become a Witness against him in a criminal proceeding commenced in
the future

Phillips

—

was

if

As

she reported the incident.

entitled t0 the protection offered

a potential witness to West’s criminal conduct, Ms.

by I.C.

§

18-2604(3), especially in light of the stated

purpose 0f the 1985 amendment t0 LC. § 18-2604(3) — “t0 Widen the scope of the current Witness
intimidation statute

Purpose,

is

by allowing prosecution

RS No. 11019 (amending

I.C. §

18-2604(3) (1985).)

considered t0 be dicta, this Court should

Finally,

West contends, “His

in a broader category

now make

it

of situations.” (Statement of

Even

if the initial ruling in

Curry

a holding.

alleged threat had nothing to d0 with Ms. Phillips providing

testimony.” (Appellant’s Brief, p. 10.) However, West’s threat to
the just-committed assault to the police

kill

Ms.

encompassed the chain of events

Phillips if she reported

that

would have led

t0

her being a witness against West. The reasonable inferences to be drawn from West’s words and

11

conduct

at the

time of the incident

are,

he was afraid

he would likely be charged With a crime, and

(c)

that, (a) if

Ms.

Phillips

t0 testify about the incident at a future preliminary hearing,

E m,

m,

Ms.

Phillips called the police, (b)

would

likely

be called as a Witness

grand jury proceeding, and/or

131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607 (reasonable inferences drawn in favor of verdict);

121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001 (same).

That West threatened Ms. Phillips before

any criminal proceedings were commenced should not excuse him from criminal
LC.

trial.

§ 18-2604(3).

liability

under

Regardless of whether there were any criminal proceedings pending, West’s

conduct and words reasonably showed he believed Ms. Phillips might become a Witness against

him

in a future criminal proceeding.

As MLcer and Curr
that is determinative.

Ms.

Phillips

“may be

intimidated her

upon which a
Idaho

at

demonstrate,

it is

West’s belief at the time he intimidated Ms. Phillips

Because West clearly believed

at the

time of the alleged intimidation that

called as a Witness” in a future criminal proceeding,

by threatening

t0 kill her if she called the police, there

rationale jury could convict

397-398, 283 P.3d

at

him

and because he actually

was

substantial evidence

for felony witness intimidation.

144-145; Mercer, 143 Idaho

at 126,

138 P.3d

E

Cirry, 153

at 326.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

verdict ﬁnding

West

DATED this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment entered upon the jury’s

guilty of felony intimidating a Witness.

lst

day of October, 2019.

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTEICATE OF SERVICE

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of October, 2019, served a true and correct
copy 0f the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
I

File

and Serve:

ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

JCM/dd
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